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Introduction and Overview
Networked Infrastructure systems deliver services and/or products from point to point
along the network.  They include transportation networks (e.g., rails, highways, airports,
sea ports), telecommunication networks (by frequency-bounded airwaves or cables), and
utilities (e.g., electric power, water, gas, oil, sewage).  Each is a fixed capacity system
having marked time-of-day and day-of-week patterns of demand.  Usually, the statistics
of demand, including hourly patterns (i.e., means and variances) are well known and
often correlated with outside factors such as weather (short term) and the general
economy (longer term).
An infrastructure system is typically difficult and expensive to design and construct. 
Once built, it can have a mean lifetime from 20 years (telecommunications) to over 100
years (water).  As population and the economy grow, increasingly large demands are
being placed on infrastructure systems.  Eventually they must be upgraded due to lack of
adequate capacity and/or the need for improved technology.   However, that moment can
be delayed, often for long periods, by the use of congestion pricing to reduce peak
demand.  Congestion pricing provides incentives to shift demand from peak time periods
to lower demand periods.  This effectively increases the capacity of the system without
the need for additional investment.
Current examples of congestion pricing schemes include:  time of day congestion pricing
for autos in Singapore and London; for-profit 'toll-ways' adjacent to freeways; time of
day pricing for electricity; time of day pricing for long distance telephone calls; revenue
management in airlines to balance out travel demands over the course of a week and over
the year; and auction type bidding for some infrastructure services, with higher prices
paid for congestion periods.
This paper investigates congestion pricing across critical infrastructures in terms of the
potential benefits of forgone investment achieved by reducing peak demand.  It also
presents several existing implementations of congestion type pricing.  We then look at the
political and economic impediments to widespread adoption of such pricing schemes.
Finally, the paper presents areas of future research to develop congestion pricing
strategies that provide efficiency gains and are politically acceptable and amenable to
implementation across infrastructure domains.
2Background
Most services industries have predictable cyclic patterns of demand for their services,
with demand peaks and demand valleys. The cycles usually have multiple frequency
components:  daily, weekly and seasonal.  To satisfy the peaks, capacity needs to be
expanded to meet peak demands.  At other times, the infrastructure supporting the service
may sit idle.
A classic example is American movie theaters.  Many of us who go to the movies will
say the theaters are generally crowded.  That is our experience.  Over the course of the
past year, we may even have missed a film at a time of our choice because all the tickets
were sold out.  Yet, over the course of a typical week in US movie theaters, the ratio of
tickets sold to tickets offered for sale – over all time slots of films shown – is typically
about 5%!  We experience congestion in theaters because most of us go at the same times
as others do – Friday and Saturday evenings!  These are peak demand periods.  How
many go to see the Tuesday 11:30 AM first-in-day showing?   So the movie theater
management must build capacity to match peak demands on weekend evenings while
enduring nearly empty theaters during much of the rest of the week.  Demand
management is used in a modest way in theaters, as matinee prices are usually less than
evening prices, an inducement to customers to utilize the facilities during off-peak hours.
That is why restaurants have ‘early bird specials’ – to entice evening diners to come
early, to enjoy a less crowded restaurant and to utilize the capital investment during hours
in which – without demand management – few diners would be present.
Virtually all services industries have cyclic demand patterns, and the great majority of
them would benefit from some type of demand management.   Some, like airlines, are
now quite advanced in their use of demand management whereas others, like public
utilities, are far behind the state of the art.  Demand management was invented by the
airlines in the early 1980’s.  At that time, it was known as yield management, which
suggested managing the yield of customers on various flights using ‘market
segmentation’ and differential pricing. Currently, this process of managing yield is also
called revenue management or dynamic pricing.  We will use these terms
interchangeably.  Whatever one calls it, the science of dynamic pricing has advanced
markedly in recent years, the mathematics and science winning many scholarly awards,
and numerous firms adding substantially to their bottom lines using these concepts.  In
addition to airlines, other industry success stories have come from diverse places like the
French National Railway, rental car companies, hotels, vacation cruise liners, cellular
telephone firms and retailing.
Large-scale infrastructure systems provide services and thus are also likely to exhibit
marked time-of-day, day-of-week and season-of-year demand patterns.  They typically
exhibit regular peaks that are significantly greater than the average, or off-peak, levels of
demand.  This condition necessitates the construction of the infrastructure system with
sufficient capacity to meet the peak demand, leading to underutilization of the system
during non-peak time periods.  For systems with little or no storage capability, the
capacity must exceed the forecast peak demand to ensure continuous service.
3As the peak demand for a particular system approaches the available capacity, the system
will become congested.  There are several congestion management options available to
deal with the congestion:
1) Capacity Expansion
2) Capacity upgrades
3) Substitution
4) Rationing (Discriminatory or non- Discriminatory)
5) Loss or Degradation of Service
6) Demand Management Congestion Pricing
Capacity expansion is simply investment in additional capacity, such as extra runways,
highway lanes, power plants, wires, or pipelines.  Capacity expansion is the most direct
means of alleviating congestion, but it may not be the most cost effective.  In some cases,
capacity expansion may not be possible.  For example, the frequency spectrum is fixed
and airports and roads in urban areas often face geographical constraints that preclude
expansion.
Capacity upgrades typically consist of new technologies to increase efficiency of existing
infrastructure.  These include faster routers for the internet, intelligent traffic signals for
roads, improved air traffic control systems to reduce landing and takeoff delays, and
methods for frequency sharing in communication systems.  Capacity upgrades are
dependent upon the development of new technologies, and are often limited by
compatibility with legacy systems.  In addition, although capacity upgrades can alleviate
congestion, they do not deal with the issue of differential utilization during peak and off
peak time periods.
Substitution involves the development of alternatives for the congested service.  Public
transit is regarded as a direct substitute for driving automobiles.  Other examples include
train travel for air travel, and wires for wireless communications.  Substitution can be
limited by consumer preferences since perfect substitutes rarely exist.
Rationing is a means to allocate scarce resources in response to congestion.  Rationing
involves limiting the consumption of the good/service so that the system is able to
function without demand overwhelming the capacity.  Rationing can be implemented in a
discriminatory or non-discriminatory manner.  Discriminatory rationing favors one group
over another based on selected attributes.  It may be used to ensure that disadvantaged
groups have access to limited resources, for example handicap parking spaces.  Non-
discriminatory rationing is often instituted without control of the allocation.  Telephone
busy signals, rolling blackouts, and packed subway cars are examples of non-
discriminatory rationing.  Rationing allows those who continue to receive the service to
do so at the normal level of service quality.  Rationing enables a portion of the demand to
be served without the need for additional investment.
Loss or degradation of service, as opposed to rationing, involves a reduction in the level
of service quality or the complete loss of service. Examples include uncontrolled
4blackouts, gridlocked roadways, air traffic control delays, and slower than normal
Internet connections.  Service loss or degradation is the result of insufficient or
nonexistent action to manage congestion.
Demand management typically consists of incentives to reduce overall demand and can
include subsidies for demand side efficiency investments or for switching to alternative
systems and tariffs to reduce demand.  Congestion pricing can be considered a form of
demand management focused specifically on reducing temporal peak demand using
economic incentives. Congestion pricing may be location based since demand patterns
are typically spatially as well as temporally distributed.  All further references to time-
based pricing schemes generally apply to location-based pricing as well.  A combination
of time-based and spatially based-pricing would typically be necessary to obtain
maximum theoretical system level efficiency.
Congestion pricing can cause demand to shift to off peak periods, to substitutes, or to be
reduced overall.   The additional costs of ensuring sufficient capacity to serve the peak
demand can be eliminated by shifting demand from the peak periods/locations to off peak
periods/locations.  In addition to reducing the overall system capacity requirement,
smoothing demand patterns will increase the overall utilization of existing capacity,
potentially leading to even greater cost savings, for instance in the more efficient
scheduling of support personnel.
Types of Congestion Pricing
Congestion pricing can be implemented in multiple ways.  The theoretically most
efficient method of congestion pricing from a purely economic standpoint is to
dynamically set the congestion price at the level of the system marginal cost of the
demand increment.  More simple methods are typically implemented in practice. These
include a single peak price that is higher than the off peak price, where the peak and off
peak time periods and/or locations are well defined and static, and a variety of schemes
that are in between fully dynamic and static pricing.
Fixed time of use pricing is simple, easy to implement, and mitigates the risk to
consumers by eliminating price volatility.  The vast majority of implementations of
congestion pricing have been a form of fixed time-of-usage based prices.    Time of use
prices work better when demand patterns are regular since they can more closely
approximate dynamic prices in this case.  The disadvantage of time-of-use prices is that
they do not change with demand or system conditions and therefore are less efficient than
truly dynamic prices.
Dynamic prices provide efficient signals for demand and investment response, but can be
difficult to implement and volatile.  Dynamic pricing needs real time (or near real time)
metering, communications, and control to enable calculation of prices, instantaneous
communication of those prices, and demand response.
Critical peak pricing (CPP) is a hybrid scheme that uses a basic Time-of-Use (TOU)
scheme with a limited number of critical hours (typically corresponding to system peak
5hours) designated with a premium charged above the standard price for consumption
during these hours.  CPP offers the potential for improvement over standard TOU rates
by differentiating between peak hours and inducing greater response during the hours of
highest demand.  By limiting the number of critical peak hours, CPP effectively limits the
maximum potential reduction in overall system peak load.
CPP requires a greater degree of metering than TOU since typical TOU schemes need
only on peak and off peak consumption measurements versus CPP, which must be
capable of hourly measurements of demand.  CPP also needs additional communications
equipment in order to notify customers of the hours that are designated as critical.  The
lead time for notification is typically specified in the contract for CPP.    Longer lead
times allow consumers to plan ahead for any reductions in consumption, thereby reducing
the costs.  The tradeoff is that the need to forecast the critical periods ahead of time may
lead to inefficient designation – the service provider may falsely anticipate a critical
period due to uncertainties in demand.
Contracts for differences (CFD) are a mixture of dynamic and flat rate (or fixed fee)
pricing schemes. They provide real time pricing signals to consumers, while at the same
time providing a hedge against price volatility.  CFD contracts imply basically a two-part
tariff –
1) A flat rate for the baseline consumption
2) Real time prices for deviations from average.
CFD involves setting a baseline demand curve for which a fixed or flat fee is
charged/agreed to a priori.  Deviations from the baseline are priced dynamically.  This
has the advantage of providing a hedge for the consumer for their baseline consumption,
while maintaining incentives for efficiency.  As long as they consume their baseline or
average levels of power they will be guaranteed a flat rate.  By charging dynamic prices
for deviations from baseline, however, the incentives for reducing demand during peak
price periods are passed fully to the consumer.  CFD has the advantage of protecting the
consumer from spot price fluctuations while maintaining the incentives for peak
reductions by allowing the consumers to effectively sell back their contracted power at
times of peak prices.  The opportunity cost the consumer incurs for consuming at the
baseline level is equal to the actual cost they would face under dynamic prices.
Several issues surround the setting and updating of baselines:
1. How are they set initially?  A ‘moral hazard problem’ may exist if
consumers know in advance how the baseline will be set.
2. Are they based on average baselines (creates adverse selection) or
individually determined?
3. How often are they updated? (Lack of resolution of this issue can
foreclose investments in technologies to improve load shape if sufficient
time is not allotted for recovering costs.  On the other hand, CFD can give
6excess rents to consumers whose baselines were inaccurately set due to
moral hazard or changing conditions.)
4. Are the baselines adjusted for weather, seasons, holidays, etc?
5. What are the sizes of the deviation bands?
This section has presented a range of options for implementing congestion pricing.  Table
1 below provides a comparison of the incentives for response and the allocation of risk
provided by each of these pricing schemes.
Table 1.  Comparison of incentives and risk allocations for congestion pricing schemes.
Consumers Service Providers
     Incentives     Risk (short
term)
    Incentives     Risk
Flat Rate Efficiency only – no
incentives to shift from peak
to off peak
Fully hedged Max. incentive to
smooth out demand
curves
 Fully exposed
(except for forward or
bilateral contracts)
Time of Use
(Differential
Pricing)
Provides some incentives to
shift from peak to off peak
-may lead to shoulder peaks
-does not differentiate
between a high priced day
and a low priced day on the
spot market – no real time
adjustment incentives
 Fully hedged  Incentives to
flatten demand
within periods
Between periods
depends on the
differentials
between pricing
periods as well as
actual spot prices
  Fully exposed
(except for forward or
bilateral contracts)
Critical Peak
Pricing
 Same as TOU except
provides incentives to
shift/reduce peak demand
during critical hours
 Fully hedged
except for the
“critical hours”
Fewer incentives to
decrease peak
demand
 Hedged for critical
hours
Real Time
Pricing
Full incentives to reduce
peak consumption/shift from
peak to off peak.
Fully exposed
(although they
may enter
forward contracts
to partially or
fully hedge)
Incentives to
reduce peak
demand only
Fully hedged
Contract for
Differences
 Incentives to reduce
deviations.  Full incentives
to reduce peak demand if
payback is 100%.  May
reduce incentives to install
technology for peak
reduction since risk is
removed.  Also, may inflate
baselines (moral hazard).
 Fully hedged for
baseline
consumption fully
exposed for
deviations
 Tighten deviation
bands,
underestimate
baselines
 Fully exposed for
baseline demand fully
hedged for deviations
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This section presents gross estimates of the potential savings available by implementing
congestion pricing for several infrastructure systems.  These estimates are constrained by
the available data for each system and the scope of this paper.  They are intended to give
a general idea of the magnitude of potential savings from avoided investment and
reduced congestion.
Electricity
Shifting demand from the daily peak time periods1 to off peak periods has significant
potential to offset investment in generation and transmission capacity, as well as
capturing several secondary benefits.  An upper bound of the potential savings can be
obtained by calculating the potential benefits of perfectly leveling demand across all
hours of the year.  This assumes leveling daily, weekly, and seasonal demand patterns,
which would need large-scale storage capability to implement.  Electricity demand has a
1.6% annual growth rate [EIA, 2006].  Therefore, annual investment savings can be
determined by calculating the avoided costs of expanding system generation and
transmission capacity to keep pace with this growth rate.
In 2004, non-coincident peak demand for the US was 704,459 MW, while total demand
was 3,970,555 thousand MWh [EIA, 2005]. The perfectly smoothed demand would
therefore be 453,000 MW continuously.  This results in a maximum theoretical reduction
in peak demand of 251,000 MW (36%).
Peak Demand 704,459 MW
Total Demand 3,970,555,000 MWH
Smooth Demand 453,000 MW
Peak Reduction 251,000 MW (36%)
Annual growth Rate 1.6%
Annual Peak Growth 11,000 MW
Generation Investments
Generation capacity costs range from approximately $500 per KW for natural gas
turbines to $2000 per KW for nuclear power plants.  In order to maintain sufficient
system capacity with a 1.6% annual demand growth rate, an additional 11,000MW of
generation capacity would need to be added every year (based on peak demand).  Since a
mixture of generation technologies will necessarily be constructed, a relatively
conservative figure of $750 per KW is used to estimate avoided costs for generation
investment.  Each 11,000MW of generation capacity would cost $8 Billion at this rate.
Transmission Investments
Since transmission capacity requirements are based upon the adequacy of transmission
for serving peak demand, reducing the peak demand has a significant potential to reduce
                                                 
1 Due to the nature of electricity (flows cannot be controlled) location-based shifting of load is not possible
(e.g. you cannot move your house, factory, or power plant easily).  Only long term investment decisions –
such as building generation plants or relocating industrial facilities can affect location-based congestion.
8transmission capacity requirements.  The costs of transmission expansion are
approximately $2 billion for every 10K MW of additional transmission line capacity.
[Ofori-Atta, 2004]  By reducing peak demand as in the generation case above, $2 Billion
in savings can be achieved.
Therefore, the Annual savings from flattening peak (1.6% capacity reduction):
$2 Billion Transmission
$8 Billion Generation
With a perfectly flat demand pattern, a 1.6% growth rate can be sustained for almost 28
years without the need to expand capacity over current levels.  This would result in total
avoided costs for generation and transmission of nearly $100 Billion (Present Value using
a 10% discount rate)
Avoided infrastructure costs for every 1% reduction in peak ($)
Generation 5,300,000,000
Transmission 1,400,000,000
Total 6,700,000,000
In addition to direct investment substitution, the total benefits of peak shaving will
include reductions in spot prices (including congestion costs) and reductions in reserves
and ancillary services.
Location based Congestion Costs
Location based congestion in the electricity system occurs when specific transmission
lines approach their capacity to transmit power.  In order to maintain system stability,
generation plants are typically re-dispatched (i.e. their power output is adjusted).  Doing
so ultimately increases the costs of electricity since the output of less efficient plants must
be increased and that of more efficient plants reduced.  In some markets, these costs are
internalized in the overall electricity price, while in others there are explicit location
based congestion charges (known as locational marginal pricing (LMP)).   Demand
response can reduce such location based congestion costs, and eliminate or at least defer
the need for transmission expansion.  Annual Congestion Costs in the PJM system alone
are estimated at between $400 to $500 million per year [PJM, 2003 State of the Market].
If congestion costs are proportional to peak demand, however, it can be expected that
system congestion costs will be reduced by at least 10% as a result of an 11% reduction
in peak demand.  This will result in a savings of $40 to $50 million annually in the PJM
system alone.
The main beneficiaries of reductions in congestion costs, of course, are those who live in
congested areas.  In this case, the system benefits will not accrue evenly across all
customers.
9Loss Reductions:
Up to 10% of electricity generated is lost as it travels over the transmission and
distribution system.  Losses increase as more power is delivered across the lines.  By
reducing the peak loads, the amount of losses can be reduced as well.
Losses increase exponentially with electrical current across transmission (and
distribution) lines, therefore a reduction in power delivered (i.e., load) leads to an
exponential reduction in losses, and reducing peak load has the largest impact on
reducing losses.  The larger the differential between the peak and the off peak loads is
prior to shifting, the larger the reduction in total system losses.  For systems with
smoother load profiles, the reductions in losses will be smaller.
Ancillary services
Demand response also has significant potential to reduce the need for ancillary services.
By smoothing the overall system load and shifting reactive power demand away from
system peak loading, thermal storage will reduce the need for ancillary services such as
VAR compensation, frequency control, and reserves.  In addition to reducing the need for
ancillary services from load shifting, demand resources can be utilized directly for VAR
compensation, frequency control, and short term reserves.
For reactive power, losses are more significant.  Reactive power losses behave in the
same manner as real power losses, except that they are proportional to line impedance
rather than resistance.  Since impedance is much greater than resistance, the reactive
power losses are not only much larger than real power losses, but the subsequent
reductions in reactive power losses during peak time periods also have a greater
magnitude and potential impact.
Around 7% of total real power generation is lost through real power losses [U.S. Climate
Change Technology Program, 2003].  Losses during peak load periods can be expected to
exceed this level due to the exponential relationship between current and losses.
Reducing peak load by 20% has the potential to reduce peak losses by over one third.
This would allow for additional reductions in peak generation of at least 2% and possibly
up to 4 or 5%.  In New England, for example, there are currently 11,826 MVARs of
reactive power capacity at an annual cost of $12.4 million.  New England pays a base rate
of $1050/MVAR-yr. [ISO-NE, 2003]
The preceding section presented several areas for which peak shaving provides
significant benefits.  Congestion pricing programs in electricity can provide benefits
through reductions in physical capacity, in requirements for ancillary services, and in
losses and congestion.
Current Examples
There has been limited implementation of congestion pricing programs in the U.S.
electricity sector.  In California, consumers participating in Pacific Gas and Electric’s
time of use program have reduced their peak electricity consumption by 18%. [GAO,
2004]  An 18% reduction in peak consumption is consistent with estimates developed by
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Black (2005) and can be achieved with little sacrifice from a consumer point of view.
The number of consumers participating in time of use programs in California, however,
remains small.
In addition, Southern California Edison has an air conditioning cycling program [SCE,
2004], and California plans to implement a critical day pricing program and is investing
$1.8 billion to upgrade metering and communication equipment to implement the
program. Under this plan, 15 days will be designated as critical during each summer and
the price of electricity will be dramatically higher for those days, in exchange for lower
prices on non-critical days. [Smith, 2006]
There are several other time-of-use programs throughout the U.S. and a few critical peak-
pricing programs (e.g. Gulf Power).  In addition, there are direct demand response
programs which typically offer payments to large consumers to reduce their demand in
response to signals from the utility or system operator.  [GAO, 2005]  The government of
New South Wales in Australia has made electricity demand management a requirement
for licensing for electricity distributors. [Demand Management for Electricity
Distributors, 2004]
In order to implement congestion pricing significantly, enabling investments in metering
and communications technologies are necessary.  Current metering technologies do not
allow for monitoring of consumption during specific time periods nor is there a means to
signal dynamic changes in prices.  Existing control technologies, such as programmable
thermostats, could be used by consumers to respond to congestion pricing schemes on a
large scale, but would also require additional investment.
The best and most concise statement we have seen in support of electricity demand
management in from The Warren Centre for Advanced Engineering in Sidney University,
Australia:
Demand management answers growing electricity needs
The goal of the electricity supply industry is fairly simple: reliable delivery of electricity
to customers. Today, to deliver on that goal, the industry is facing a new imperative:
manage an effective demand management program
Demand management is one of a number of ways in which suppliers of a resource can
meet their customers’ needs by either shifting or reducing demand peaks. As the demand
for electricity is predicted to grow, the process will enable Australia to meet this energy
need.  Currently, a relatively large percentage (say 15%) of the assets required to deliver
electricity to the consumer are used on a relatively small number of peak days (say 3, or
less than 1%). Given controlled pricing for utilities, and other issues, there will be limits
to the amounts that can be invested in their infrastructure. Thus, if the peak can be kept
stable or managed down, that releases funds for wise investment elsewhere. It also has
other positive impacts.
Demand management is accepted by government, business and industry in Australia as
an alternative to developing and building new electricity generation, transmission and
distribution capacity.
It is also recognised that electricity demand needs better management in the areas of peak
load, greenhouse gases and appliance efficiency.
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A proven performer internationally for over a decade, demand management addresses the
causes rather than the symptoms of excessive energy needs. Demand management uses a
range of strategies to modify the level and timing of energy demand.  Within the demand
management toolkit are energy efficient appliances and buildings, distributed generation,
standby generation, interruptible contracts, improved network efficiency and more
accurate pricing.  For customers, the benefits of this alternative to more generation and
network expansion include lower energy bills, better energy services, the improved
utilisation of resources and fewer environmental costs.
One energy supplier that serves a rapidly growing franchise area is Integral Energy which
has embraced demand management.  “Our demand management program is reducing
capital costs, deferring network augmentation and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
There are also customer benefits as the program improves customer awareness and
education,” said Maree Zammit, Manager of Strategic Development.  An example of
Integral Energy’s approach is the program in Castle Hill, a bustling commercial and
residential suburb in northwestern Sydney.  The program is a first in Australia with
Integral Energy working with the Sustainable Energy Development Authority (SEDA) to
cut peak load in the area.  “The project involves negotiations with major commercial
customers to reduce their demand through initiatives such as efficient air conditioning
upgrades and lighting,” says Ms Zammit.  “Underpinning the program is our recognition
that effective demand management requires the involvement of all participants in the
energy value chain.”2
Airports
Air traffic demand patterns have seasonal, weekly, and hourly components.  Hourly
demand patterns exhibit peaks in both the morning and evening periods. Seasonal and
weekly patterns correspond to workweek and vacation/school schedules.
There are several potential bottlenecks in the air transportation system that can be
alleviated through capacity investment.  The most obvious means of eliminating
congestion is through the construction of new runways.  Alternative means include
improving the air traffic control system, and adding gates, taxiways, or planes to the
system.
Congestion pricing policies for air traffic can be implemented at the consumer level, the
flight level, or both.  Airlines already have sophisticated, dynamic pricing schemes for
managing consumer level demand and maximizing capacity utilization.  A similar system
of congestion pricing for planes would enable the air transportation system to operate
more efficiently.
Peak demand in air transport has both a time and location component.  The hub and
spoke system employed by many major airlines leads to several highly congested hubs
with coordinated flights to maximize connections and minimize consumer lay over times.
In addition, there is a strong seasonal component to commercial air travel.  Leisure
travelers may be willing to adjust their flight schedules within a day or week, but it is
unlikely they are able to dramatically alter the seasonal pattern to in their travel
schedules.  Business travelers have much less elastic demand (as evidenced by the
significantly higher fares they are charged by airlines) and are unlikely to adjust their
                                                 
2 http://www.warren.usyd.edu.au/bulletin/NO38/ed38art7.htm
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demand between days, and less willing to do so even within a day.  Due to the lack of
substitutes available for long distance flights, however, consumers must accommodate to
the available flight schedules.  For shorter flights, it is possible for rail, buses, or autos to
be substituted for flying.  The immediate post 9/11 decrease in air travel demand
illustrates that there is a degree of elasticity which can make congestion pricing effective
at smoothing demand peaks, however.
In order to estimate the total system capacity for the US air traffic system (commercial
aviation only), we choose the day of the year with the highest number of departures.  June
is typically the peak month for air travel.  For June 2005, the maximum number of flights
in a day was 20,899. The corresponding maximum number of flights in an hour was
1375. [BTS, 2005]
Assuming that congestion pricing policies could smooth demand within a day between
the hours of 6 a.m. and 8 p.m. results in a 9% reduction in peak demand.  Smoothing
flights across these hours on the busiest day would result in 1264 flights per hour, or a
reduction of approximately 100 flights from the peak.
According to the FAA (2004), a single runway (ignoring other constraints such as gate,
taxiways, etc.) can handle 200,000 operations (takeoffs and landings) per year.
Assuming and equal number of takeoffs and landings, this is approximately 15 takeoffs
per hour for an 18 hour day.
A reduction of 100 flights is then equivalent to adding 6 additional full capacity runways
to the system.
Using the data from Delta airlines [Boatright, 2001], at approximately $500 million per
additional runway, this is equivalent to savings of $3 Billion, not including costs of lost
time, expended fuel, wages, and additional emissions caused by delays.
This smoothing would involve distribution of flights only in time.  Since not all airports
are operating at full capacity when the system is fully loaded, even greater reductions are
possible by redistributing flights spatially.  This could be accomplished by altering the
current hub and spoke systems while minimizing disruptions/eliminations of service by
simply rerouting some flights.  In order to dramatically smooth out airport demand peaks
across the entire system, it is likely necessary to eliminate the hub and spoke system.
Weather related reductions in system capacity are a significant contributor to delays in
the air transport system.  Some of these delays can be reduced by additional investment,
such as the runway project at Logan Airport in Boston.  This runway would increase
capacity during certain weather conditions, but would not increase the overall capacity of
the airport.  Congestion pricing, however, may have limited applicability to weather
related delays.
Applying congestion pricing to weather related congestion is complicated by the inherent
uncertainty associated with weather events and the general lack of short term
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substitutability of flights.  Congestion pricing could determine the priority of flights
during weather events, allowing the most valuable (in terms of willingness to pay) flights
to receive preference for take off or landing slots.  Weather related dynamics congestion
pricing, however, would not likely be able to significantly alter flight schedules ahead of
time to prevent delays/congestion from occurring during weather events.
In addition to reductions in capacity investment, additional savings can be obtained by
reducing delays associated with congestion.  Winston (1991) estimated that
approximately $6 Billion3 could be saved by congestion pricing and 17 Billion4 by
congestion pricing combined with optimal investment.
Attempts to implement congestion related pricing have been made in Boston, New York,
and London.  In each case, the congestion pricing was fairly static and based on aircraft
size and/or time of day.   The programs were successful in terms of reducing flight
demand and congestion.  The majority of demand reductions were obtained through
significant increases in the relative costs for smaller aircraft.  Legal challenges from those
most affected by the congestion, however, forced each jurisdiction to eventually abandon
or significantly reduce the programs. [Schank, 2005]
Sea Ports
Investment in harbors and channels more than doubled from 1991 to 2000 to $252
million [GAO, 2002].  Smoothing demand for harbors could alleviate some of this cost.
Some cargo (such as foodstuffs) is much more time dependent than other cargo (e.g.
clothing).  The less time critical cargo would then theoretically be more elastic in terms
of paying congestion prices.  This is offset, however, by the opportunity costs to ships of
delays.   The combination of (relatively) low levels of investment and long time scales
makes it likely that the benefits of congestion pricing applied to shipping in terms of
reducing investment costs will be small.
Altering sea traffic is more difficult due to the time constants involved in transit, loading
and unloading, and diverting traffic from one port to another.  In addition, the
interdependency with land based transit (roads and railroads) and security/customs
checks makes diversion of ships to underutilized harbors more complicated.
Roads
Over $25 billion was spent to increase highway capacity in the U.S. in 2000.  Yet,
according to Schrank (2006), this was not sufficient to meet even 50% of the growth in
vehicle miles traveled.  Traffic increased an average of 3.5% per year from 1983 to 2003
in the U.S.  Since traffic has grown at a faster pace than highway capacity, congestion has
continuously increased.  The average travel delay for peak period drivers has grown from
16 hours per year to 47 over this time, creating over $60 billion in annual congestion
costs. [Schrank, 2006]
                                                 
3 Converted to year 2003 dollar-equivalent.
4 Converted to year 2003 dollar-equivalent.
14
In order to deal with the growing problem, there are 4 basic options:
1.  Congestion pricing
2.  Capacity expansion
3.  Shifting demand to public transit
4.  Do nothing – live with congestion delays [Downs].
Due to the difficulties in expanding capacity in urban areas and the limitations of public
transit (both physical and due to preferences), congestion pricing has the most potential to
alleviate congestion.  Congestion pricing faces political obstacles such as concerns over
fairness and unwillingness by consumers to pay for a service that has been “free” for
some time.
Benefits of congestion pricing for roadways include:
 Avoided investment
 Reduction in delays
 Reduction in fuel costs
 Reductions in Maintenance
 Improvements in Emergency services.
Due to the localized nature of traffic congestion, there is no overall national demand
pattern from which to estimate overall effects of a generic congestion pricing policy.  The
TRB (1994) estimates that peak period pricing could save between $5 and $11 billion in
investments and time.
There are several methods to implement congestion pricing for highways.  They include
manual toll booths (which can create bottlenecks themselves), automatic toll booths (e.g.
fast lane), zone licensing, or electronic pricing with automated identification (photos or
smart cards).  [Hau, 1992]
London and Singapore have both instituted congestion pricing programs and have seen
significant results.  In London, drivers pay a fee to enter the central London zone during
the hours from 7 a.m. until 6:30 p.m.  The fee is static and does not vary by hour or road
conditions.  [Litman, 2006]  In the first year of implementation, traffic in the central
London zone was reduced by approximately 15% (see Figure 12 below). [Transport for
London, 2005]
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Source: Transport for London, 2005.
As shown in the figure above, even though the program significantly reduced traffic in
the central zone, the majority of the reduction is in the intermediate hours.  The evening
peak actually increases and the morning peak reduction is less than the overall reduction.
This is the limitation of having a single fee for all of the commuting hours.  The overall
system capacity requirement was not reduced as much as it would be with differential
pricing for the two peak hours.
Singapore introduced zonal pricing in 1975 and as increased the sophistication of the
system over time.  Singapore now uses electronic charging with 30 minute time
increments and locational differentiation.   Also, the transitions from one charging level
to another are graduated to prevent sudden, dramatic changes which can lead to adverse
consumer behavior (such as speeding to avoid a higher priced time period).  There are
also different prices for cars, motorcycles, and light and heavy trucks.   Congestion prices
are reviewed and updated quarterly. The congestion pricing system has enabled average
highway and arterial road speeds to be maintained. [LTA, 2006]
Communications (wire and wireless)
Between 1980 and 2001, there was approximately $1.2 trillion invested in the US
telecommunications sector [Phoenix Center, 2006].  Averaging investment over this time
period allows for a smoothing of the telecom investment “bubble” and gives a value of
approximately $56.5 billion per year.  This investment encompasses the entire telecom
industry.  The convergence of ITC services makes this a reasonable figure to use in
estimating the amount of investment needed to keep pace with annual demand growth.
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Stuck (2003) estimates a 7.25% annual growth rate in the telecom sector, across all
services. Using congestion pricing across telecom services would therefore result in a
potential savings of approximately $7.8 billion for each percentage reduction in overall
peak demand5.  A 10% reduction in peak demand could therefore eliminate up to $80
billion in investment.
Telephone service has an established history of time based congestion pricing, but not
with dynamic congestion pricing.  Implementation of dynamic congestion pricing for
telephone service is technically feasible and straightforward.  The nature of the internet
(independent servers and routers, which are co-dependent for transferring data), however,
makes implementation of congestion pricing complex under current operating
methodologies and jurisdictions.   Current protocols do not lend themselves to
implementation of priority pricing.  Although individual ISPs are able to implement their
own congestion based prices, these may or may not synchronize with overall system
conditions.  The potential for significant gains through dynamic or priority pricing exists,
but is largely dependent upon the development of standards/protocols to enable such
pricing schemes.
Pipelines –
Pipelines represent another category of networked infrastructure systems.  The ability to
store oil, gas, water, and other resources that utilize pipelines, however, tends to limit the
potential for congestion pricing, since storage may be used to alleviate spikes in demand
without the need for additional pipeline capacity. In cases where storage costs are
significant and storage is not used as a hedging mechanism for fluctuations in the price of
the basic commodity, congestion pricing may be a viable means to reduce
storage/pipeline investments.  Total annual investment in pipeline systems (including
equipment and storage) is approximately $2 billion for natural gas [EIA, 2005] and $3
billion for water [BTS, 2006].  Many of these expansions are for service to new areas,
and not to directly relieve congestion.
Three R’s: Robustness, Resilience and Redundancy
Critical infrastructure systems provide life-supporting services to customers.  They must
be able to continue to do that under a wide range of circumstances.  Our ‘intellectual
device’ to estimate present value, discounted future savings by flattening the demand
over the course of 24 hours is clearly just that – a device that gives an upper bound to
possible savings.  No one expects that demands could ever be smoothed to total flatness.
Customers with their preferences and life style constraints would not tolerate it.  In
addition, if such flat demand patterns were to become a reality, these infrastructure
systems would not be able to function at full capacity 100 per cent of the time.  There are
needs for scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, repair and system upgrading.  That
means that we must anticipate and plan for ‘down time’ in parts of the system.
                                                 
5 Assuming that investment is equal to demand growth.
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There are outside perturbations and even shocks to the systems that can cause them to
operate in extreme modes, something they can do only for short periods of time.  An
example is the set of supply chain systems shocked by the terrorist events of September
11, 2001, when for instance massive queues of trucks lined up at Canadian border points
attempting entry into the USA, but enhanced security delayed their passage6.  Hurricanes,
tornados, floods, intense heat and long droughts - all sorts of extreme weather can
interfere with planned operations of infrastructure systems.
Thus these systems must be designed with robustness and resilience in mind.  Robustness
means strong and durable, able to withstand shocks.  Resilience means able to recover
quickly from unexpected conditions or setbacks, bendable but not breakable.
Redundancy – meaning multiple parallel system components -- is one system design
strategy that can lead to improved robustness and resilience.
Despite some components of system redundancy, the nation’s electric power system has
shown repeated lack of resilience over the past 50 years.  Massive cascading East Coast
blackouts are examples, the first major one in 1965 (November 9)7 and the most recent
one in 2003 (August 14)8.  But even this past summer (2006), there were numerous
smaller system breakdowns, seemingly due to unseasonably hot temperatures in New
York, severe storms in St. Louis, etc.  So, any attention to demand management in
electrical power systems must simultaneously address issues of resilience and robustness.
An idea that we put forward in the last section of this paper, a semi-automated demand
management system to support ‘graceful degradations of electrical service,’ could in
theory go a long way toward increasing both robustness and resiliency.
Care must be taken not to over-optimize an infrastructural system.  Many airlines use
sophisticated mathematical optimization tools of operations research to schedule aircraft
and crews, to minimize costs while satisfying myriad constraints.  Unfortunately many of
the mathematical depictions of airline operations used in these optimizations assume that
the sun is shining over the entire country, that no crewmember is sick and that no plane
requires unscheduled maintenance.  Rarely do these conditions hold, meaning that
optimized plans that assume a deterministic system operating under idealized conditions
become brittle plans, with little resiliency.  Manual scrambling is then needed to adjust
system operation to the realities of weather, crew sickness and airplane repair.  At least
one private parcel delivery air carrier plans for contingencies, in essence flying two
redundant empty airplanes over the USA at critical times to be dispatched to trouble spots
to pick up parcels that otherwise would not be delivered on time – due to one or more of
the problematic conditions cited here.
                                                 
6 See for example Sheffi, Y. Supply Chain Management Under the Threat of International Terrorism,
International Journal of Logistics Management, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp 1 – 11, 2002, and Y. Sheffi, The
Resilient Enterprise: Overcoming Vulnerability for Competitive Advantage, MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA, 2005.
7 Sometimes called The Great Blackout of the Northeast.  See
http://www.historyplace.com/specials/calendar/november.htm#5.
8 Sometimes called The Great Blackout of 2003.  See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_North_America_blackout.
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The maximum jolt to the US airlines occurred on September 11, 2001, when all planes
were indefinitely grounded, many sent to airports for from intended destinations.  This
left the airlines in a condition far from usual stochastic perturbations due to the factors
discussed above, and in a state never anticipated. CALEB Technologies, working with
Continental Airlines, developed the CrewSolver decision support system to generate
globally optimal or near optimal crew recovery solutions.  Continental used this system
as soon as clearance was given by the U.S. Federal Government to resume flying.  As a
result, Continental was first in the air back at full planned scheduled.  The airline claims
to have saved $40 million just by this first application of the system.  Their recovery time
was minimized by the CrewSolver system, a system that has now been adopted by other
airlines9.  This type of system shows that service systems that use heavily demand
management tools and techniques and are thus tightly optimized, can still be resilient in
the presence of minor and major perturbations, but care and attention must be devoted to
the topic.
Barriers to Implementation
As this paper has shown, there are large potential benefits from the implementation of
congestion pricing to several infrastructure systems.  There are, however, several barriers
to implementation of congestion pricing.  They include:
 Distributional Effects
 Cost Allocation
 Status Quo Bias
 Lack of information
Congestion pricing programs typically will have a greater impact upon certain consumer
groups, such as small aircraft (airports), commercial customers (electricity), trucking
companies (roads).  These distributional effects create a strong interest in the disaffected
groups to oppose congestion pricing.  The majority, on the other hand, is not motivated to
action in support of congestion pricing since the benefits are uncertain and diffuse.  As
seen above, airport congestion pricing programs have been rolled back in several
jurisdictions for exactly this reason [Schank, 2005].
In addition to political interests, it is often difficult to calculate the actual costs of
congestion in order to set the “right” congestion price.  The theoretically optimal
congestion price is equal to the marginal costs of congestion created/incurred by the last
increment of demand.  Even is this cost could be calculated, dynamically implementing it
would be difficult and create fairness issues.
Consumers also are conditioned to free services (roads) or stable prices (electricity) and
therefore proposals for implementation of congestion pricing are typically viewed as
attempts to raise prices and/or create volatility.  Status quo bias amongst consumers and
regulators creates a reluctance to implement congestion pricing until after a crisis has
                                                 
9 Yu, Gang, et. al., A New Era for Crew Recovery at Continental Airlines, Interfaces, Vol. 33, No. 1, Jan.-
Feb., 2003, pp. 5-22.  On line at http://pubsonline.informs.org/feature/Edelman/1526-551X-2003-33-01-
0005R.pdf
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been identified. This reluctance is only relieved then if the congestion pricing can be seen
to directly solve the crisis.  Regulators especially tend to be risk averse since they will
rarely lose their jobs for continuing previous policies or following the methods practiced
by a majority of other regulators.  Innovative programs such as congestion pricing can be
risky for regulators, especially since they will disadvantage certain constituency groups.
A lack of information often leads to opposition to congestion pricing programs as well.
In California, for example, a consumer advocate criticized the variable pricing program
that offers a discount for the vast majority of days and charges a premium only on the
hottest days of the summer.  The advocate complained that consumers without air
conditioning would not be able to reduce their consumption on the hot days when prices
are raised [Smith, 2006].  The advocate failed to understand that customers without air
conditioning would benefit the most from the variable pricing.  Consumers without air
conditioning would enjoy the benefits of discounted electricity for the vast majority of
the time and already consume much less during the high priced hours.
Consumers with air conditioners use the most electricity on hot days, since their air
conditioners are running more often, and these consumers will pay the most under
variable pricing.  With fixed pricing, consumers without air conditioning are subsidizing
those who do have air conditioning since all consumption is treated the same and
averaged over time.    A lack of understanding/information as to the true benefits and
costs of congestion pricing programs can create opposition from the very consumers who
would benefit the most.
Interdependency of system (internal and external).
Low levels of interdependency can allow for local/regional experimentation with
congestion pricing policies with little opposition from (or impact on) other regions.  High
interdependency makes coordination across regions more necessary due to externalities.
Actions in one interdependent region can have great affects on other regions.
Electricity and ICT – most interdependent.  Local actions can have far reaching
effects instantaneously.  Also, many other systems are dependent upon both the electric
system (e.g. traffic lights, light rail, pumps for pipelines, ATC systems) and ICT for
operation.
Air Traffic – Highly interdependent (internal).  Due to hub and spoke system and
the existence of a few major airports with the majority of all traffic, actions in one airport
will affect several others.
Pipelines – somewhat interdependent.  Individual branches of a pipeline are
independent.  Pipelines may require electricity to operate.
Rail – some interdependence – central nodes can affect other nodes.  Regional
traffic may be independent.
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Roads – mostly independent.  Local actions to relieve traffic congestion will have
little or no effect on other cities/areas.
Downs (2004) claims that the only viable option is to allow highway congestion to
continue since congestion pricing is politically unacceptable, expansion is too costly and
would take up too much urban space, and public transit is only able to relieve a small
portion of the problem even if greatly expanded.
E-ELECTRICITY MANAGEMENT
The ideas of this paper can be used to create new products and services, all with load
management in mind.  Here we present the ideas for one such new product, in the area of
electricity demand management.
We propose a system for automated graceful shedding and/or delay of discretionary
electricity usage in the home, business or other location.  The system may use Bluetooth,
the Internet, wi-fi, RFID, and other new communication technologies, in conjunction
with a home computer or special control box, to turn OFF or delay turning ON one of
more addressable electrical ‘appliances’.  In USER CONTROL mode, such a system
would reduce user costs when the electricity provider institutes time-of-day or dynamic
state-of-the-system pricing. One wants to shave the peaks and fill in the valleys of
electricity demands.  A 2nd usage – PROVIDER CONTROL MODE -- would be for
graceful degradation of service in those cases in which the electricity provider would
usually implement blackouts or brownouts.  With the proposed system, everyone would
‘hurt a little’ instead of a few (those being shut down 100%) being hurt a lot.  This
system is Step 1 in creation of a home- or business-based lifestyle energy optimizing
system.
Opportunity.  MIT is now committed to deep and serious research on energy.  This
proposed new product envisages a world in the not-too-distant future – perhaps in
response to MIT’s initiatives -- in which electricity is priced more in line with the
marginal cost of its production and delivery.  It is the least efficient electricity generation
plants that are turned on last, and they are most costly to operate.  And they tend to be
polluters.  Those who use electricity in peak periods should have to pay top dollar.  Those
who defer until off-peak times should pay less.  It is the law of supply and demand, and
consumers can have some control over their own demand profiles.  We imagine a device
(in the home or business) that can communicate with electrical appliances (we use the
word ‘appliance’ with broad meaning) to turn off or defer turning ON such appliances
when the current quoted price of electricity is too high.  These appliances can be turned
on later, when the cost is lower.  An exemplary application is the electric water heater
and its use to wash dishes or clothes.  But there are many others.  The device we have in
mind may in fact be a piece of software for one’s Internet-connected home computer
together with several electrical devices attached to addressable appliances.  If such a
device can be placed on the market for about $100 and in a world in which there is time-
of-day or dynamic pricing of electricity, the purchaser of our proposed system may save
on his or her electricity bill the purchase price or more just in the 1st year of usage.  The
utility providing the electricity may want to subsidize its purchase, perhaps even install it
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free, due to the fact that the utility can use the device in PROVIDER CONTROL MODE
to gracefully shed a percentage of load during summer blackout or brownout conditions,
thus saving some customers from total shutdown.  The market for this device is equal to
the number of homes and businesses in the USA. We might expect several millions of
these devices to be sold and installed in Year 1 of production10.
Proposed Approach. The proposed e-Electricity Management System is a product for
both consumer and provider, providing a win-win situation.  Within lifestyle preferences
and constraints, the consumer can manage her/his use of electricity to minimize cost
within an environment that charges higher prices for electricity during higher demand
periods.  We are bringing the science of revenue management, invented by the airlines in
the 1980’s as a response to airline deregulation, to electricity usage – also in part due to
deregulation and in part due to high prices of energy.  Airlines price seats higher during
higher demand periods, and the consumer with lifestyle options can select off-peak
flights to save money.  In our future world of electricity, the utilities and other providers
will charge more for electricity during peak periods, and the consumer again with
lifestyle flexibility has the option to purchase certain amounts of electricity at off-peak
hours.  This helps everyone – the consumer who saves money, the utility that does not
need to expand capacity (billions of dollars), and the public that sees less air pollution
from old plants.
From the electricity-provider’s point of view, brownout and blackout situations can now
be approached by using the new product in PROVIDER CONTROL MODE, shutting
down fractions of electricity usage for many instead of unfairly shutting down 100% for
some customers and leaving the remainder untouched.
Prior art is best represented by these documents:
1.  Constantopoulos, P., F. Schweppe, and R. C. Larson, "ESTIA:  A Real-Time
Computer Control Scheme for Space Conditioning Usage Under Spot Electricity
Pricing."  Computers and Operations Research, 18(8): 751-765,1991.
2.  Jason W. Black, Integrating Demand into the Electricity System:  Technical,
Economic and Regulatory Frameworks for Responsive/Adaptive Load.  MIT Ph.D.
Thesis ESD, June 2005.  (Plus 6 related refereed journal papers and symposium
proceedings).
The envisaged final product to be offered to the public would be a Lifestyle Energy
Optimizing System in which the e-Electricity Management System would be an
important component.  The Lifestyle Energy Optimizing System would also include data-
mining and algorithmic software that would monitor the energy-related lifestyles of the
occupants of the home or business and manage energy usage internally within the
structure in a way statistically compatible with lifestyles.
                                                 
10 For external confirmation of market need, see United States Government Accountability Office,
"Consumers Could Benefit from Demand-Response Programs, but Challenges Remain," August, 2004.
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04844.pdf
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Example 1:  With room-based or floor-based thermostats, the system can automatically
adjust downward or upwards the temperature in a room or floor in anticipation of
people’s regular movements and needs for that space, adjusted in real time by knowledge
of each person’s current location (via RFID or similar device on each person).
Example 2:  As an RFID-tracked occupant moves from one room to the next, the TV or
stereo can be turned off in the vacated room and, if preferences suggest it, turned on in
the new room occupied.  One’s entertainment environment can efficiently track a person
around a house, while maintaining only one set of ‘entertainment appliances’ ON at any
given time.  From a marketing point of view, this is not only a ‘Smart House,’ it is a
‘Cool House’!
Conclusions
Congestion pricing has the potential to provide large benefits across multiple
infrastructure systems.  The highest potential for benefit is in electricity and roads simply
due to the magnitude of spending on these infrastructure systems.    The few examples of
actual implementation have demonstrated success (see: Singapore, London – roads;
California – Electricity; London - Airports), but have not led to large-scale
implementation.  Political barriers, including distribution of costs, often inhibit
implementation of congestion pricing.  Rent sharing mechanisms can overcome political
barriers by reducing opposition by disadvantaged groups.  Status quo bias is a large
impediment and making examples of existing successful programs can build regulatory
will/confidence to implement congestion pricing on a larger scale.
Table __. Potential for congestion pricing to reduce infrastructure investment costs.
Domain Peak Cycle
time
Min Demand
response Time
Method of
response
Potential
Savings
Electricity Daily instantaneous Shift, forego $10B per year
Roads Daily ~ hourly Substitute, shift $5-11B11 per
year
Airports Daily, Weekly Hours to days Substitute,
forego, shift
$17B
Ports ?? Weekly or
more
shift Small
Pipelines ?? Instantaneous
(with storage),
shift ??
Telecom Seconds, daily < seconds,
hourly
Shift/delay $80B
                                                 
11 NRC 242
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Future Research
There are several directions in which we could take this research.  One obvious one is to
fill in the blanks in some of our knowledge about infrastructure systems other than
electric power, the system we know best.  This we are eager to do.  This could lead to a
finalized position paper on this topic perhaps 50% longer than this paper.  In order to do
that fully and completely, we would ask domain experts in airlines, roadways, ports and
pipelines, to read over our relevant sections and to make suggestions regarding demand
management ideas, research, practices and current impediments.
But we are eager to pursue the idea of graceful load shedding in electric power industry.
To do this, our proposed next steps are as follows:
1. Meet with industry representatives to understand and document current best
practice, emerging experiments and trials in electricity demand management, and
impediments to increased use of demand management in the electric power
industry.
2. Try to create a consortium of electric power industry advocates for this type of
work.
3. Working with electrical engineers in MIT’s Department of Electrical Engineering
and Computer Science and/or in MIT’s Media Lab, design and build a prototype
system for graceful degradation that could be used in a home or office.
4. Try to obtain investment funds to bring the prototype to the next stage, where
commercialization may be possible.
We look forward to discussing these ideas with those who read this paper to explore
mutually beneficial directions going forward.
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